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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00-

DONNA S. TALLEY,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
GLENN E. TALLEY,

Case No. 20357

Defendant/Appellant.
00O00-

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a divorce case.

The wife, Respondent in this

appeal, filed a Complaint against her husband, the Appellant.
She sought, among other things, an equitable distribution of the
marital assets and debts, alimony, and attorney's fees.

The

husband counterclaimed and asked for, among other things, an
equitable distribution of the real and personal property and
debts of the marriage.
The case was tried to the Honorable Rodney S. Page.

Each

side was represented by counsel and presented documentary evidence, their own testimony, and testimony of third parties.

The

trial court took the matter under advisement and filed a Memorandum Decision on September 4, 1984. A Decree reflecting that
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decision was entered on November 14, 1984.

Itf in part, awarded

both parties a divorce, gave the wife alimony for a limited
period of time, awarded her a portion of the attorney's fees
requested, and distributed various items of personal and real
property to the parties.

No post-trial motions were filed, nor

did the Appellant object to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, or Decree of Divorce.
The husband filed a Notice of Appeal on November 21, 1984.
The wife has not cross-appealed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because Appellant's Statement of Facts fails to mention
certain facts which Respondent believes to be significant to the
determination of this appeal, she wishes to supplement and
clarify that Statement of Facts as follows.
This was a fifteen-year marriage (TR-5).

In December of

1983, Respondent testified that her husband had threatened to
shoot her (TR-7) and, consequently, she was required to secure a
Temporary Restraining Order against him removing him from the
marital residence (R-50).

When the Temporary Restraining Order

was heard, the parties agreed that it could be made permanent
(R-15) and the court allowed Respondent to stay in the home
(R-56).

She has continuously resided theire since 1968.

worked all but eight months of the marriage (TR-10).
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She

Both parties brought homes into the marriage (TR-9, 113),
Appellant did not want to reside in Respondent's home (TR-61)
and, therefore, it was rented and ultimately sold (TR-9).

That

sale generated a profit of $6,600.00 which was placed in a joint
savings account (TR-9), along with Respondent's child support
from a previous marriage and portions of her salary (TR-10, 13).
The Court received an appraisal of Appellant's home valuing
it at the time of the marriage at $17,650.00 (Exhibit 1, TR-113).
The mortgage balance at that time was $14,981.37 (TR-12).

In

1973 the parties' joint savings account described above was used
to pay off the entire mortgage on the marital residence (TR-9).
Both parties worked throughout the marriage.

At the time of

trial, Appellant was a foreman for Lone Star Industries and was
earning $3,000.00 per month gross and $2,018.00 per month net
(Exhibit D-4).

He started the job fourteen years ago (TR-66>.

In 1983 he made $42,761.00 (Exhibit P-13) and as of August 15,
1984, had earned $28,478.00 (TR-64, R-179).

Respondent works for

Forrest's Concrete Pumping as a dispatcher and bookkeeper
(TR-33).

She grosses $1,200.00 per month and nets $953.00 per

month (TR-12, Exhibit D-4).
Exhibit P-12).

In 1983 she made 510,928.81 (R-73,

She has no other sources of income (TR-33).

Her

salary will not qualify her for any long term financing (TR-11).
In connection with his employment, a retirement fund and a
profit sharing plan was established for Appellant.

As of the

trial, the balance in the profit sharing stock option plan was
3

$27,196.00 (R-94, 178). He also has a retirement fund which he
acknowledged as an asset of the marriage (Exhibit D-2), but
claimed it had no value.

Mr. Rob Roy, an actuarial expert called

by Mrs. Talley, reviewed Appellant's retirement fund documents
and concluded that that fund had a present value of $30,040.93
(TR-74-76).

A letter from Mr. Roy documented that conclusion

(Exhibit P-17) and was received into evidence (TR-75). Mr.
Talley also had $7,114.58 in an I.R.A. (Exhibit P-9). That
account was awarded to him (R-164).

Other than $9,250.20 in her

I.R.A., Mrs. Talley has no pension plan (TR-23).
Respondent introduced and testified about several exhibits
which described the marital assets, including the furniture
(Exhibits P-3, 4 and 5 ) , the penny stocks (Exhibit P-6), the home
(Exhibits P-l and 2), the automobiles, the boat, the silver, the
bank accounts, the Merrill Lynch account, the I.R.A.'s, and the
retirement and profit sharing plans (Exhibit P-9). Appellant
testified as to some of these, but notably did not mention the
penny stocks, his guns and sporting goods, and the ESOP stock.
In fact, the only evidence on those assets was provided by
Respondent (TR-19, Exhibits P-6 and 9) .
In addition, Respondent testified as to the furniture she
brought into the marriage (TR-14 and Exhibit P-3) and that Appellant had taken property with him when he vacated the residence
(TR-17).

At the time of separation, the parties had a bank

account of $20,445.00 and two days after service of the Temporary
4

Restraining Order Appellant removed $6,000.00 from that account
(TR-23).
The monthly expenses of Respondent (Exhibit P-8) were based
on her average expenditures after reviewing her cancelled checks
(TR-30).

Appellant did not present evidence as to his monthly

expenses and admitted giving his daughter substantial sums from
his earnings since the parties1 separation (TR-126, 129). In
fact, he admitted having extra money for investments he made
after separation (TR-132).
In Mr. Talleyfs Statement of Facts, he concludes that the
trial court should not have divided the assets equally between
the parties.

This position is directly contrary to his testimony

where on several occasions he stated that all he wanted was a
fifty/fifty distribution (TR-116, 121, 139; Exhibits D-3, 5 ) .
Finally, it is important to note that the trial court's
Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
(copies are included in the Addendum to this Brief) specifically
set forth the values of the property (R-177, 178) (values now
disputed by Appellant) and yet Appellant filed no objections to
those findings, approved the same (R-183, 188), and made no
motions for a new trial or to amend the Decree.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I
A decision of a trial court in a divorce action should not
be disturbed unless there is a clear showing of a misapplication
of the law or an abuse of discretion resulting in a substantial
error or a serious inequity.

Appellant has not shown that the

trial court in this matter misapplied the law or abused its
discretion on either the support or property distribution issues.

POINT II
The trial court's method of valuing the property of the
parties was proper and supported by credible evidence.

Mr.

Talley did not contradict the evidence presented by Mrs. Talley
and an expert witness concerning the value of Appellant's retirement fund and the penny stocks and ESOP stocks.

The trial court

carefully weighed the evidence presented by both parties concerning the value of the parties1 boat, the value of the home
furnishings, and the contributions of the parties to the marital
home.

It fulfilled its role as the fact finder and then deter-

mined the values of these properties and then made a fair and
equitable property distribution.

Each award to one party was

balanced by an award to the other based upon the values found by
the court and each consequently received an award of one-half of
the marital assets.
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POINT III
Under the circumstances, the trial courtfs award of alimony
was proper.

From testimony provided by Appellant and Respondent,

the trial court found that Mr. Talley netted twice as much as
Mrs. Talley and that she needed support.

She asked for permanent

alimony of $500.00 per month and received only $250.00 per month
for two years and $150.00 per month for three years, with the
alimony payment to then terminate.

The length of the marriage

(fourteen years), the disparity of income ($2,018 per month
versus $952 per month), and the monthly needs of Mrs. Talley
clearly support the award made.

POINT IV
The trial courtfs award of less than half of Respondent's
attorney's fees was supported by credible evidence and at no time
during the lower court proceeding did Appellant object to that
award of fees.

Not only was the award proper, but Appellant is

not entitled to raise an issue before this Court which was not
raised in the trial court proceedings.

POINT V
Because Appellant's claims are without merit and Respondent
has been required to defend this appeal, she should be awarded
her attorney's fees and costs in connection with this appeal.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN A DIVORCE ACTION
SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED UNLESS THERE IS A CLEAR SHOWING
OF A MISAPPLICATION OF THE LAW OR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION RESULTING IN A SUBSTANTIAL ERROR OR A SERIOUS
INEQUITY.
The Appellant, Mr. Talley, contends that the trial court
erred in its award of alimony and inequitably allocated marital
property and, consequently, abused the wide discretion afforded
it in making such a property distribution and support award.

The

evidence presented to the trial court clearly shows that this was
just not the case.
In order to prevail on this appeal, Appellant is required to
show that the trial court, in making its support award or distribution of property, misunderstood or misapplied the law, entered
findings not supported by the evidence, or caused a serious
inequity so as to constitute an abuse of discretion.
v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah, 1977).

See English

As was clearly

stated in Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah, 1974):
Although it is both the duty and prerogative of this
court in a case of equity to review the facts as well
as the law, Article 8, Section 9, Constitution of Utah,
the trial judge has considerable latitude of discretion
in adjusting the financial and property interests in a
divorce case. The actions of the trial court are
indulged with the presumption of validity, and the
burden is on appellant to prove such a serious inequity
as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion [footnote].
There is no fixed formula for the division of property;
§30-3-5 U.C.A. (1953) provides that when a decree of
divorce is made the court may make such orders in
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relation to property as may be equitable, [footnote]
Id. at 700.
Mr. Talley's burden is not an easy one and the record does not
show any inequity which would constitute an abuse of discretion
by the trial court.

As was stated in Bader v. Bader, 18 Utah 2d

407, 424 P.2d 190 (1967):
It would lead to intolerable instability of judgments
if this court should assume the prerogative and accept
the responsibility of merely second guessing a trial
judge who has done a conscientious job of attempting to
make just and equitable allocation of the property and
income of the parties in regard to alimony and support
monies as the trial judge appears to have done here.
It is due to this fact, taking into consideration the
nature of the trial judgefs authority and duty, and his
advantaged position, that in such matters he is allowed
a comparatively wide latitude of discretion which will
not be disturbed in the absence of clear abuse . . .
Id. at 151.
After a complete trial and the receipt of thirty-three
exhibits, the trial judge properly weighed all of the factors
related to this case and fashioned a remedy that would be as fair
as possible to both parties under the circumstances of this case.
The Memorandum Decision of the trial court has all the earmarks
of a fair and final effort to adjust all doubtful equities so as
to not harm either party (see Addendum).

Because Mr. Talley

appears to be dissatisfied with only certain aspects of the trial
court's decision, he has now requested this Court to substitute
its judgment for that of the trial court.

That request would is

an invasion of the trial court's function as the fact finder and
fashioner of equitable remedies.
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As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to set the record
straight regarding certain claims of Appellant that the trial
court did not properly consider the value of the property it
distributed.

Evidence was presented by both side (documents and

testimony) pertaining to the value of the property in issue (the
house, the boat, the automobiles, the furniture, the stock, the
bank accounts, and the retirement accounts).

The trial court, in

reaching its final decision, considered all of the evidence
presented to it in determining what indeed was fact.

It is not a

proper approach, as Appellant would urge, to conclude that merely
because evidence was offered with regard to the values of certain
pieces of property, that that evidence need automatically be
taken as fact.

It is the job of the trial court, after receiving

all of that evidence, to carefully weigh the same and conclude,
based upon that evidence, what the facts of the case are.

That

is exactly the procedure used by the trial court in this case and
certainly should not be subject to attack, as Appellant has
attempted to do in his brief.
The parties in this case were married for approximately
fifteen years.

Each initially contributed about the same amount

of money or property to the marriage and each worked and assumed
the obligations of husband and wife during the relationship.
There was no evidence before the court that Mr. Talley should be
entitled to any more than one-half of what the parties had worked
for during the relationship.

Likewise, there was no evidence
10

that Respondent would be entitled to more than fifty per cent of
the marital assets.

Each side, in presenting its evidence,

requested a fifty/fifty distribution (see Exhibits P-9 and D-3).
Appellant, on several occasions during his testimony, admitted
that all he was seeking was an equal distribution of the property
(TR-116, 121, 139) .
Now, for purposes of this appeal, Appellant has changed his
position and concluded that he is entitled to more than fifty per
cent and that the equal distribution of the marital property
fashioned by the trial court is now not an equitable distribution.

The basic flaw in Mr. Talleyfs approach is that he has not

shown that there has been any misapplication of the law or any
abuse of discretion which resulted in any inequity to him.
Rather, he now complains that the trial court found that various
items of personal and real property had values different than
those attributed to that property by Appellant.

In assigning

those values, the trial court was only doing its job as the fact
finder.
When there is a discrepancy in testimony rendered by
the witnesses, the fact-finder must decide which
account is the most accurate. Then on appeal, we must
review the facts in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party. Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 530 (Utah,
1979).
The question then becomes "was there credible evidence presented
to the trial court to allow it to establish the values it did for
the property in question?"

The answer to that question is "yes.11
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S METHOD OF VALUING THE PROPERTY OF THE
PARTIES WAS PROPER AND SUPPORTED BY CREDIBLE EVIDENCE,
A.
THERE WAS UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE AS TO THE VALUE OF
APPELLANT'S RETIREMENT FUND.
Appellant claims that the trial court erred in placing a
value on his retirement fund.

It is a fact that Appellant does

have a retirement fund which had been contributed to for his
benefit by his employer, Lone Star Construction.
continues to increase.

The fund

He goes so far as to admit that this was

an asset of the marriage (see Exhibit D-2) which is found in the
Appendix to his Brief.

The only question he had was "what was

the value of this asset?"
In order to establish that value, Respondent called Mr. Rob
Roy, who was duly qualified and is an expert in the field of
actuarial calculations.

Mr. Roy concluded that that retirement

fund, based on the figures provided to him by Mr. Talleyfs
employer, had a present cash value of $30,040.93 (TR-74).
Appellant, on cross-examination, attempted to challenge that
valuation (TR-78); however, the expert's opinion did not change.
Appellant offered no evidence of his own as to the value of that
pension plan.

In spite of Mr. Roy's unrefuted testimony, the

trial court gave Appellant the benefit of the doubt in finding
that its present value was only $15,000.00 when it could have
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clearly and properly found that the present value of this marital
asset was in excess of $30,000.00.
Mr. Talley then argues that since the asset is not presently
liquid and can only be utilized after his retirement, the trial
court should not have handled it as it did.

A similar argument,

made by a dissatisfied husband, was rejected by this Court in
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah, 1982).

In concluding

that a retirement fund acquired during the marriage was a marital
asset subject to equitable distribution, this Court stated:
Whether that resource is subject to distribution does
not turn on whether the spouse can presently use or
control it, or on whether the resource can be given a
present dollar value. The essential criterion is
whether a right to the benefit or asset has accrued in
whole or in part during the marriage. To the extent
that the right has so accrued, it is subject to equitable distribution. 1x3. at 433.
In this case there was uncontradicted expert evidence that the
present value of that fund was $30,040.93.

Mr. Talley also

acknowledged that it was an inheritable asset (TR-96).

The trial

court then recognized that it would be six years before Mr.
Talley could begin receiving the benefits associated with this
asset and adjusted the value in half to compensate for the
inability to have the immediate benefit of the funds.

No error

has been shown in the way the trial court valued and disposed of
this asset and there was certainly sufficient evidence on which
to make its finding.
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B.
THE VALUE OF THE PARTIES1 BOAT WAS SUPPORTED BY CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.
Mrs. Talley admits there was a question of fact as to the
value of the parties1 26-foot motor boat, trailer, and accessories.

There was conflicting evidence on the value of this

property.

Respondent testified that she had heard her husband

state that the value of the boat was $20,000.00.

(TR-21).

Appellant, without sufficient foundation, offered two business
cards of third parties which contained notations as to what the
individuals named on the cards thought the boat to be worth
(Exhibit D-16).

Those were received by the trial court over the

properly made hearsay objections of Respondent.

Perhaps, the

most credible evidence presented to the trial court related to
the boat's value was Mr. Talley's own statement when he was asked
on cross-examination whether he would sell the boat for
$11,500.00 and he quickly and succinctly stated that he would
not.

(TR-124).

The fact of the matter is there was evidence

before the trial court to allow it to find a value of the boat
within the range of $11,500.00 to $20,000.00.

The court consid-

ered the testimony of the parties and the fact that there was a
trailer and accessories which accompanied the boat and found that
the boat's fair market value was 516,000.00.
no error in connection with this valuation.
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Appellant has shown

c.
THE EXISTENCE AND VALUE OF THE PENNY STOCKS AND THE
ESOP STOCKS WAS ESTABLISHED BY UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE.
Appellant claimed there was no evidence related to the
existence of the ESOP stock nor the value of various penny
stocks.

That is simply not the case.

Appellant presented no

evidence with regard to these assets; however, Respondent did.
That evidence is reflected on Exhibits P6 and 9.
found in the Addendum to this Brief.)

(Exhibit P-9 is

In connection with her

testimony related to Exhibit P-6, Respondent was asked whether
these stocks existed and she said they did and she was asked to
state in her opinion the value of those stocks based upon current
prices quoted from the same.

She did that and no objection was

made over the introduction of this evidence.

Likewise, in

Exhibit P-9, Respondent was asked about the existence and value
of each asset of the marriage.

One of those assets listed on

that exhibit was the ESOP stock, which she believed to be worth
$691.28.

No objection was made to that exhibit, nor to her

testimony.

The only evidence before the trial court with regard

to this property was the evidence provided by Respondent and the
trial court in no way erred by accepting that evidence as fact.
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D.
THE VALUE OP THE HOME FURNISHINGS WAS ESTABLISHED BY
EVIDENCE PROVIDED BY BOTH PARTIES,
Like the value of the boat, each party testified as to what
he or she thought the value of the home furnishings was and
provided documentary evidence which was received without
objection.

Mr. Talley valued the home furnishings at $6,000.00

and suggested that Respondent be awarded $5,000.00 of that
property and that he receive $1,000.00 (TR-90).

On the other

hand, Mrs. Talley concluded that the worth of that property was
$3,575.00 (TR-16, Exhibit P-9). The trial court weighed the
exhibits and testimony and found that the value of this personal
property was $3,500.00 and awarded the Respondent $3,000.00 of
that sum and Appellant the remaining $500.00.

The Respondent's

china and Appellant's guns were not included in that personal
property distribution and valuation and their disposition is
discussed in Point F below.

Like valuing the boat, the trial

court reviewed the evidence and within the prerogatives granted
to it determined what it felt to be the value of this property.
No error has been shown.

E.
THE VARIOUS CONTRIBUTIONS OF BOTH PARTIES TO THE
MARITAL HOME WERE FULLY CONSIDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
Appellant claims that he should have received some type of
reimbursement for an interest he claims he had in the marital
16

home prior to his marriage to Respondent.

That claim flies in

the face of the undisputed evidence that the fair market value of
the home at the time of the marriage in 1968 was $17,650.00
(TR-11, Exhibit P-l) and that the mortgage balance as of the date
of marriage was $14,981.37 (TR-12).

Utilizing those two figures,

the most equity that could have existed as of the date of the
marriage was approximately $2,700.00.

Appellant failed to

mention that during the course of the marriage Respondent's home
which she brought into the marriage was sold and a profit of
$6,600.00 was realized from that sale (TR-9).

Mr. Talley admit-

ted that those proceeds were placed in a savings account and held
until 1973, at which time they were used to pay off the entire
mortgage balance then existing on the marital residence (TR-113,
TR-115).

On that basis alone, Respondent contributed' at least

$3,000.00 more to the purchase of the marital residence.
Appellant claimed that he had put approximately $3,000.00
additional improvements into the marital residence (TR-87) and
that evidence was also weighed and considered.

The court then

found as fact that based upon this testimony and the contributions each party had contributed an equal amount to the marital
residence (R-163 and 178) . Such an approach is certainly not
error and can in no way qualify as an abuse of discretion or
misapplication of the law that must be shown in order to overturn
a property distribution.
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F.
THE AWARD OF THE CHINA COLLECTION TO THE WIFE WAS
OFFSET BY THE AWARD OF THE GUNS AND SPORTING GOODS TO
THE HUSBAND.
The award of the china collection to Respondent was offset
by the trial courtfs award of the guns and sporting goods to
Appellant.

Appellant claims that there was testimony regarding

the value of the china collection and that testimony consisted of
what Appellant stated he had heard his wife say it was worth
$5,000.00 (TR-99) .
$2,500.00.

In Exhibit D-2 he then values it at

No evidence was offered as to the value of the guns

and sporting goods, marital assets he could have erroneously
concluded went to him automatically.
It is difficult to look into the mind of the trial court in
order to determine each and every reason for a certain property
distribution, but it is certainly logical to conclude and clearly
not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to have decided
that Respondent, being the wife of the parties, would be entitled
to the china collection which she had acquired during the
marriage, while Appellant, being the husband, would be more
satisfied receiving the guns and sporting goods.

Once again, in

the final analysis, even as it relates to this minor issue, the
trial court's concern over finding an equitable way to resolve
this dispute is clearly evident by the property distribution
itself.

18

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT1S DECISION REGARDING ALIMONY WAS PROPER
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
Appellant complains that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Respondent $250.00 per month alimony for two
years and $150.00 per month alimony for an additional three years
(R-185).

Respondent had asked for $500.00 per month permanent

alimony (TR-34).

This was a fifteen-year marriage (R-176).

She

stated that the home was in need of substantial repairs (TR-31)
and that her car needed repairs (TR-17).

She netted $953.00 per

month as a dispatcher and bookkeeper (TR-106) and he received
$2,018.00 per month as a foreman for Lone Star Construction.
to August 1984, he had earned $28,478.00 (Tr-64).

Up

In 1983 he

earned $42,761.00 (TR-37, Exhibit P-13) while Mrs. Talley earned
only $10,928.81 for that year (Exhibit P-12).

Respondent esti-

mated her monthly expenses to be $1,320.00 (Exhibit P-8, TR-30).
Mr. Talley presented no evidence as to his expenses and stated he
had extra money to invest while this action was pending (TR-312).
He also made substantial cash payments to his daughter after the
parties' separation (TR-126, 129).
The following comparison shows what income each will be
receiving under the alimony award made by the trial court.
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Mr. Talley

Mrs. Talley

Net monthly income
Alimony award

2,018.00
- 250.00

953.00
+ 250.00

Net disposable income
(first 2 years)

1,768.00

1,203.00

Net disposable income

1,868.00

1,103.00

(last 3 years @ $150/month)
Appellant has $565.00 more per month than Respondent on
which to live.

Respondents minimal monthly expenses certainly

exceed the amount of income she has availaible to her from her
employment and the court's alimony award.

This Court stated, in

Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah, 1980):
The function of alimony is to provide support for the
wife as nearly as possible at the standard of living
she enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent the wife
from becoming a public charge. Id. at 1223.
Even with this limited award of alimony it is unlikely she will
be able to meet her day-to-day expenses and will be required to
reduce her standard of living from the level she enjoyed while
married to Appellant.

He, on the other hand, admitted he had

more money than he needed to cover expenses (TR-132).
In his Brief, Appellant seems to interrelate the property
settlement with the alimony award to support his claim that the
alimony award was excessive.

As this Court observed in English

v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah, 1977):
There is a distinction between the division of assets
accumulated during the marriage which are distributed
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on an equitable basis and the post-marital duty of
support and maintenance. Icl. at 411.
Mrs. Talley certainly is not going to live in the manner to
which she was accustomed during the marriage any more than Mr.
Talley.

Unfortunatelyf that just happens to be one of the

unavoidable realties of any divorce action.

Neither party will

have the standard of living he and she enjoyed when married.
Mr. Talley also fails to mention the income tax advantage
which will be received by him and the additional tax liability
Mrs. Talley will incur because of the alimony she receives.
The trial court, as it normally does, took a difficult
situation and attempted to minimize the financial impact of the
divorce on both parties.

No abuse of discretion has been shown.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES WAS JUSTIFIED AND CERTAINLY NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
A.
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE WIFE
IN AN AMOUNT LESS THAN HALF OF WHAT WAS REQUESTED WAS
NOT ERROR AND WAS SUPPORTED BY CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.
When this action was filed, Respondent requested that
Appellant pay all of her attorney's fees and costs (R-3).
Appellant answered and denied that she was entitled to attorney's
fees (R-16).

His Counterclaim was silent on the issue (R-17).

At trial, Respondent stated she needed her attorney's fees paid
(TR-40).

Her income was half that of her husband (TR-12).
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The

trial court heard evidence from her counsel on attorney's fees
and received into evidence a detailed and comprehensive computer
print out which reflected all time and costs expended and
described each task performed by her counsel (Exhibit P-18).
Appellant gave no testimony as to fees nor did he choose to
cross-examine Respondent's counsel (R-81).

He further stipulated

that Exhibit P-18 could be received (TR-80), as well as the
proffer of testimony from her counsel.

With that evidence before

it, the trial court acted within its discretion and awarded
Respondent attorney's fees and costs of $1,500.00.

She had asked

for $3,844.00 (TR-81).
By stipulating to the admission of Exhibit P-18 in conjunction with proffered and received testimony of her counsel, and by
not raising the objections he has now raised in this appeal,
Appellant has, at the least, waived his right to claim that the
trial court committed error on this issue.

With the testimony of

Mrs. Talley's counsel, the detailed time sheets received into
evidence, the stipulation of Mr. Talley's counsel, the failure to
object or cross-examine, and his general approval of the Findings
and Decree, he now cannot claim that there was inadequate
evidence on the issue of attorney's fees.
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B.
THE APPELLANT MAY NOT RAISE THE ISSUE OF REASONABLENESS
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
Appellant claims that the award of attorney1s fees was error
because no evidence was presented as to the reasonableness of
those fees.

Respondent had asked for $3,844.00 fees and $136.00

costs (TR-80).

The court requested only a proffer, received all

of the accounting information on those fees, and ultimately
awarded less than half of that amount - $1,500.00 (R-187).
Appellant did not object to the proffer.
during closing arguments.

No objection was made

No objections to the Findings, Conclu-

sions, and Decree were made.

In fact, the Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law were approved as to form (R-183).

No motion

to amend or for new trial was made.
This appeal is the first time those attorney's fees were
ever questioned.

"It is axiomatic that matters not presented to

the trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal."
Franklin v. New Empire Financial Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040
(Utah, 1983).

See, also, Shayne v. Stanley & Sons, Inc., 605

P.2d 775 (Utah, 1980), and Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah,
1977).

Appellant's own actions in failing to call this claimed

error to the attention of the trial court now preclude him from
challenging that award, as he has attempted to do.
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POINT V
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWAPD OF HER ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS APPEAL.
No error has been shown to have been committed and Mr.
Talley's appeal of the trial courtfs decision is without merit.
When an appeal is shown to be without merit, the Respondent has
the right to request this Court to award her attorney's fees
associated with the appeal.

As this Court properly concluded in

Carter v. Carter, 584 P.2d 904 (Utah, 1978):
However, the defendant argues that inasmuch as the
plaintiff was unwilling to abide by the trial court's
judgment, and that she has been put to the necessity of
defending this appeal, the plaintiff should have to
bear the costs thereof, including reasonable attorney's
fees for her counsel. We agree with the reasonableness
and propriety of her request. Tfootnote] ][d. at 906.
See, also, Ehninger v. Ehninger, 569 P.2d 1104 (Utahf 1977).
Here Respondent does not have substantial assets and has a
limited net income of $953.00 per month (TR-12, 105). On the
other hand, Appellant nets at least $2,018.00 per month (TR-105)
and has funds remaining after his expenses to make investments
(TR-132).

Fairness requires that Respondent not be required to

deplete her limited assets in demonstrating that this appeal is
without merit.

She requests this Court to remand to the trial

court for determination an award of her attorney's fees and costs
associated with this appeal.
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CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
Appellant has not raised any issues on appeal about which he
can show there has been a misapplication of the law or an abuse
of discretion resulting from a substantial error or a serious
inequity by the trial court.

The trial court's method of valuing

the property of the parties was proper and was supported by
substantial evidence and testimony presented at trial, including
expert testimony.

The trial court judge took all proffered

testimony and evidence, placed a reasonable value on each piece
of personal property, and fashioned a property distribution and
support award that would be as fair as possible to both parties.
Based on the length of the marriage and the income disparity
of the parties, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding Respondent a limited amount of alimony for a limited
period of time.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in

awarding to Respondent $1,500.00 in attorney's fees.

Appellant

did not raise the issue of reasonableness of attorney's fees at
the trial court level.

What Appellant did not challenge before

the trial court cannot now be raised on appeal.
Because Appellant's arguments on appeal are without merit
and the trial court acted well within its discretion in all
matters pertaining to the trial of this matter, Respondent should
be awarded her attorney's fees and costs associated with this
appeal.

25

The decision of the trial court should be affirmed in all
respects and the matter remanded for a determination of Respondent's attorney's fees and costs on appeal.
Respectfully submitted this

/&

day of April 1985.

GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING S/LIAPIS

Kent M. Kastifrg

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
above and foregoing Respondent's Brief were duly mailed by
placing the same in the United States Mails, postage prepaid, at
Salt Lake City, Utah, addressed to:
Stephen A. Van Dyke, Esq.
Bean & Smedley
Suite 2
190 South Fort Lane
Layton, Utah 84041
DATED this

/£

day of April 1985.
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ADDENDUM
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Assets of the Parties
Home ($64,500 appraisal)
$2,500.00 equity to H
$6,600.00 reimbursed to W

$55,400.00

1980 Thunderbird

2,500.00

1982 Ford Pickup and Camper Shell

7,000.00

1971 Honda 90 Motorcycle

250.00

1975 Honda XL Motorcycle

400.00

Furniture & Furnishings

3,575.00

Utah Bank & Trust (checking) - H

6,395.06*

Utah Bank & Trust (savings) - J

20,445.84**

Tracy Collins (checking) - W

250.00

Boat - J

20,000.00

Stocks

1,236.50

IRA - First Interstate - W

9,250.02

IRA - United Bank - H (3 accounts)

7,114.58

Silver - 500 oz. ($6.00/oz.)

3,000.00

ESOP - H
31.422 shares ($22.00/share)
Portland Cement Profit Sharing - H
(as of July 31, 1984)
Merrill Lynch Share Builder
442.0598 shares
TOTAL

691.28
27,426.86
8,730.68
$173,665.82

$173,665.82 -, 2 = $86,832.91
PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

Pension and Retirement - W
Grand Total
* As of December 7, 1983
** As of September 30, 1983
Decmeber 21, 1983.

7

3mi -xv—!
Husband withdrew $6,000.00 on

Division of Assets
Wife

1980 Thunderbi rd
1971 Honda 90
Furniture &
Furnishings
Tracy Collins
(checking)
IRA - First Interstate
Sub-total
Cash
TOTAL

</>•

Home

Husband
55,400.00
2,500.00
250.00
3,075.00
250.00
9,250.02
70,725.02
+ 16,107.89
$ 86,832.91

1982 Ford pickup
1975 Honda XL

$ 7,000.00
400.00

Utah Bank & Trust
(checking)

6,395.06

Utah Bank & Trust
(savings)

20,445.84

Boat

20,000.00

Stocks

1,236.50

IRA

7,114.58

Silver

3,000.00

Furniture & Furnishings

500.00

ESOP

691.28

Portland Cement profitsharing account
27,426.86
Merrill Lynch
Share Builder
Sub-total
TOTAL

8,730.68
$102,940.80
- 16,107.89
86,832.91

Plaintiff to be awarded $500.00 per month in alimony.
Defendant to be ordered to pay to Plaintiff the sum of $2,500.00
in attorney's fees.
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DONNA S. TALLEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil

Action No. 34879

MEMORANDUM DECISION

GLEN S. TALLEY,
Defendant.

This matter came before tbe Court for hearing on the 27th day
of August, 1984.
Paul Liapis.
Smedley.

Plaintiff was present and represented by attorney

Defendant was present and represented by Stanley M.

The Court heard the testimony of the witnesses and the

evidence profered by the parties and being fully advised in the
premises makes its Memordandum Decision as follows:
1.

That the Court has jurisdiction.

2.

That each of the parties should be granted a decree of

divorce from the other based upon mental cruelty, to become final
upon entry.
3.

That the Court finds that the equity which defendant had in

the home at the time of the marriage was approximately equal to the
amount of cash subsequently contributed by the plaintiff and therefore that the parties have equal value in the home.
4.

The home of the parties is awarded to the plaintiff free

and clear of any claim of the defendant and the Court values the
home at $65,000.00.
5.

Plaintiff is awarded the vehicle in her possession and the

Honda 90 and the Court finds that they are worth $4,200.00 and $250.00
respectively.
6.

Plaintiff is awarded the furniture and fixtures in the home

with the exception of those items listed in Defendant's exhibit 7,
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excluding therefrom the lawn mower and fertilizer spreader which
is awarded to the plaintiff. The Court finds the items awarded
to the plaintiff have a value of approximately $3,000.00 and those
awarded to the defendant approximately $50 0.00.
7. Each of the parties are awarded their personal property
and possessions and defendant is awarded his sports equipment.
8. That the plaintiff is awarded the food storage and freezer
items and Court values them at approximately $600.00.
9. Court awards to the defendant the truck and Honda 250,
having a value of approximately $6,550.00 and $400.00 respectively.
10. Defendant is to be awarded the 1978 Fiberform boat, together with accessories and the Court finds that the value thereof
is approximately $16,600.00.
11. That defendant is awarded those items of furniture and
miscellaneous proeprty listed in defendant's exhibit 7 with the
exception of the lawn mower and the fertilizer spreader which is
awarded to the plaintiff.
12. That the defendant is awarded the parties interest in the
Portland Cement Profit Sharing valued at $27,196.00 and in the Lone
Star stock, valued at $8,700.00.
13. Each of the parties is awarded their IRA accounts.
14. Defendant is awarded the penny stock worth approximately
$1,236.00.
15. Court finds that the retirement of the defendant is vested
and that the actual value is difficult to determine because it is
contingent upon the number of years that defendant would live following retirement. For that reason Court values it at $15,000.00 and
awards any interest therein to the defendant.
16. The Court awards the silver to the defendant and values it
at $3,000.00.
17. That the defendant is awarded the ESOP stock and Court
values it a t $690.00.
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18. The Court awards to the plaintiff no interest in the
defendant's life insurance.
19. As to the savings accounts of the parties Court finds
that $2,000.00 of that amount consists of tax reserve and awardes
the same to the defendant. The Court finds that approximately
$4,000.00 was used to purchase the silver and that silver now has
a value of $3,000.00 which has been awarded to the defendant. The
balance of $14,000.00 from savings is awarded $8,750.00 to the
plaintiff and $5,250.00 to the defendant which brings the amount
awarded to the parties as equal as the Court is able to do with
the circumstances.
20. Plaintiff is ordered to assume and discharge the debt
to Sears and to Allmans and any other debt which she has incurred
since the date of separation and to hold defendant harmless thereon.
21. That defendant is ordered to assume and discharge any
debt which he has incurred since the date of separation and to hold
the plaintiff harmless thereon.
22. Defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff the sum «of
$250.00 per month as and for alimony for a period of two years
after which said alimony is reduced to the amount of $150.00 per
month, said alimony to terminate at the end of said five year
period or upon plaintiff's remarriage or as provided by law, which
ever occurs first.
23. Each of the parties is awarded any sums in their respective
checking accounts.
24. Each of the parties is awarded the furniture and fixtures
that they brought into the marriage with the exception of the items
which have been given to the children previously.
25. Defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff, for the use
and benefit of her attorney, the sum of $1,500.00.
26. Plaintif's attorney is ordered to draft the Findings and
Decree and submit to opposing counsel for approval before forwarding
to the Court for signature.
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DATED this 4th day of September, 1984.

1&

RODNEY S./PXGE
~~ f
Districts^Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 4th day of September, 1984 I
mailed a copy of the Memorandum Decision to Paul H. Liapis,
counsel for the plaintiff, 48 P.O. Place, New York Life Bldg,
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101 and to Stanley M. Smedley, attorney
for the defendant, 190 South Fort Lane, Layton, Utah, 84041,
postage pre paid.
MICHAEL G. ALLPHIN, Clerk of Court

By da^gy
/IT

6*«l^
'

Deputy Clerk

-',,'Jkl,1,iWri''-Ml *

PAUL H. LIAPIS - 1956
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Third Floor, New York Building
48 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 532-6996
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
DONNA S. TALLEY,
Plaintiff,

GLEN S. TALLEY,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 34879

Defendant.
ooOoo
This matter having come on regularly for trial on the 27th
day of August, 1984, before the Honorable Rodney S. Page, one of
the Judges of the above-entitled Court, Plaintiff appearing in
person and by and through her attorney, Paul H. Liapis, and
Defendant appearing in person and by and through his attorney,
Stanley M. Smedley, and the parties and other witnesses having
been duly sworn and examined under oath, and documentary evidence
having been marked and received by the Court, and more than three
(3) months having elapsed since the filing of Plaintiff's
Complaint, and the Court having heard the arguments of counsel
for Plaintiff and Defendant and having inquired into the legal

sufficiency of the evidence so adduced, and being fully advised
in the premises, does now make, adopt and find the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff was a bona fide and actual resident of Davis

County, State of Utah, for more than three (3) months immediately
prior to the filing of the Complaint herein.
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant are husband and wife, having

been married on June 14, 1968, in Bountiful, Utah, and having
separated in December, 1983.
3.

Two children have been born as issue of this marriage,

namely, Kelly, now age 22, and Teresa Ann, now age 27.
4.

On numerous occasions prior to the filing of

Plaintiff's Complaint herein, Defendant treated Plaintiff
cruelly, causing great mental distress and suffering, in that,
among other things, Defendant has constantly threatened Plaintiff
and the children with violence, has caused numerous arguments
over small inconsequential matters, and has failed to meet the
needs of the Plaintiff as a woman, wife and mother, all of which
has destroyed the feelings of love and affection once held by
Plaintiff for Defendant, causing this marriage to exist in name
only.
5.

On numerous occasions prior to the filing of

Plaintiff's Complaint herein, Plaintiff treated Defendant
cruelly, causing great mental distress and suffering, in that,
among other things, Plaintiff's child from a prior marriage has
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caused inconvenience and annoyance to the Defendant, has refused
to leave the home after he has attained his age of majority, and
Plaintiff has put her children before the Defendant, all of which
has destroyed the feelings of love and affection once held by
Defendant for Plaintiff, causing this marriage to exist in name
only.
6.

The Court finds from the testimony of Plaintiff and

Defendant that the parties have been separated for a long time
with no minor children, that all of the efforts at reconciliation
have failed, that there is no good or useful purpose that would
be served in prolonging this marriage, and that a Decree of
Divorce should be entered and the same should become upon final
signing and entry.
7.

The Court finds that the parties, during the course of

their marriage, have acquired the following personal property:
1971 Honda motorcycle

$

250.00

1980 Thunderbird

4,200.00

Furniture, furnishings, fixtures
and appliances in the family home
and lawn mower and fertilizer spreader

3,000.00

Furniture items with the Defendant
and/or hereby awarded to Defendant
as per his Exhibit 7-D

500.00

Freezer and food storage

600.00

1982 Ford pickup and camper shell
1975 Honda XL motorcycle
1978 Fiberform boat, together with accessories

6,550.00
400.00
16,600.00

/

Defendant's interest in his Portland Cement
profit sharing plan

27,196.00

Defendant's interest in Lone Star stock

8,700.00

First Interstate IRA (W)

9,250.02

United Bank IRA (H) (three accounts)

7,114.58

Penny stocks

1,236.00

Defendant's retirement account

15,000.00

500 ounces silver

3,000.00

ESOP stock plan

690.00

Utah Bank & Trust savings account

16,000.00

Tracy Collins checking account (W)

250.00

Utah Bank & Trust checking account (H)

200.00

8.

The Court further finds that the Defendant prior to

this marriage acquired a home located at 1163 South 350 West,
Bountiful, Utah.

The Court also finds that at the time Plaintiff

moved into the home, she contributed from proceeds received from
the sale of the home she owned prior to the marriage the sum of
$6,600.00 and that each party, therefore, owns an equal interest
in this home.

The Court further finds the home to be valued at

$65,000.00 by stipulation of the parties, with no mortgage or
encumbrance against the property.
9.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff is presently

employed by Flower Aviation with a net income of $922.28 per
month.
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10.

The Court finds from the testimony of Ashby S. Decker

that the Defendant is presently employed by Lone Star Industries
with a gross income through the 15th of August, 1984, of
$28,478,00.
11.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has present

obligations outstanding to Sears in the sum of $66.00 and
Allman's Carpets in the sum of $66.00.

The Court finds that the

Defendant has indicated no outstanding debts and obligations.
12.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has incurred attorney's

fees in connection with this matter.
13.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has no interest in

the Defendant's life insurance policies.
14.

With regard to the Defendant's retirement account, the

Court finds that said account is vested and that the actual value
is difficult to determine because it is contingent upon the
number of years that the Defendant would live on retirement.

The

Court further finds that the Plaintiff's actuarial expert, Ronald
N. Roy, has placed a value of said retirement account at
$30,040.93.

The Court finds the reasonable value of said account

to be $15,000.00.
15.

Specifically with regard to the $20,000.00 savings

account held by the parties with Tracy Collins Bank, the Court
finds that $2,000.00 of said amount consists of tax reserves
maintained by the Defendant.

The Court further finds that

approximately $4,000.00 of said account was used to purchase the
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500 ounces of silver, which the Court has valued above at
$3,000.00.
16.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff is in need of

additional support from the Defendant for a period of five (5)
years.
17.

The Court finds that each of the parties should be

awarded the furniture and fixtures which they brought into the
marriage, with the exception of those items which were given to
the children previously.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and
adopts its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded a Decree of

Divorce from each other upon the grounds of mental cruelty, with
said Decree to become final upon signing and entry.
3.

The home of the parties located at 1163 South 350 West

Bountiful, Utah, is hereby awarded to the Plaintiff, DONNA S.
TALLEY, as her sole and separate property, free and clear of any
interest of the Defendant.
4.

Defendant is ordered to pay to Plaintiff the sum of

$250.00 per month as alimony for a period of two (2) years, after
which, said alimony is to be reduced to the sum of $150.00 per
month for a period of three (3) additional years, with said
alimony then to cease at the termination of the five-year period
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or upon Plaintiff's remarriage or as provided by law, whichever
occurs first.
6.

Defendant is awarded as his sole and separate property

the 1982 Ford pickup truck and camper shell, the 1975 Honda XL
motorcycle, his Utah Bank & Trust checking account, the $7,250.00
from the parties' Utah Bank & Trust savings account (which
includes the $2,000.00 awarded Defendant for tax reserves), the
1978 Fiberform boat with accessories, his IRA accounts, the 500
ounces of silver, the Defendant's ESOP plan, the Defendant's
Portland Cement profit sharing plan, Defendant's retirement
account, Defendant's Merrill Lynch Lone Star stock plan, the
furniture in Defendant's possession defined as bedroom set, gun
cabinet, 300 Savage rifle, 12-gauge shotgun, 22 Browning rifle,
22 Colt revolver, X-70 camera, G.E. tape recorder, binoculars,
Honda 500 watt generator, McCullough chain saw, battery charger,
3/8 inch hand drill, 1/2 inch hand drill, vibrating sander, 2
coleman stoves, 2 coolers (red and blue), suitcase, Toro 7-24
snow blower, car stands, new RCA television, couch which makes
into a bed, globe on stand, his sports equipment, the penny
stocks with Tintic Mining, Classic Mining, Modern Minerals,
Midnight Gold and Silver, Gyro, Stansbury and Airlift
International, and his personal effects and belongings.
7.

Plaintiff is awarded as her sole and separate property

the 1980 Thunderbird, the 1971 Honda 90 motorcycle, all the
remaining furniture, furnishings, fixtures and appliances,
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including the lawn mower and fertilizer spreader, the freezer and
food storage, her Tracy Collins checking account, her First
Interstate IRA account, $8,750.00 of the parties1 Utah Bank &
Trust savings account, and her personal effects and belongings.
8.

Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay and hold the

Defendant harmless therefrom the following obligations:

The

accounts with Sears and Allman's Carpets.
9.

Defendant is ordered to assume and pay and hold the

Plaintiff harmless from any debts or obligations incurred by him
since the date of separation up to the present time.
10.

The Defendant is hereby awarded all interest he holds

in his life insurance policies to do with as he chooses.
14.

Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the Defendant in

the sum of $1,500,00 for attorney's fees in this matter.
15.

The parties are each awarded the items of furniture and

fixtures which they brought into the marriage, with the exception
of those items which have been given away by the parties to their
children, and that position is ratified by the Court.
16.

The parties are ordered to execute any and all

documents necessary to carry forth the intent of this order.
DATED this

/l/^day of ectobor, 1984.
BY THE COURT:
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APPPOVED AS TO FORM:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was mailed,
postage prepaid, to Stanley M. Smedley, Esq., Layton Professional
Center, 190 South Fort Lane, Suite 2, Layton, Utah
s - day of October, 1984.
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